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First Impressions 
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the Seton 
Hall Circuit Review members, of issues of first impression identified by 
a federal court of appeals opinion between September 1, 2005 and 
January 31, 2006.  This collection is organized by circuit. 
Each summary presents an issue of first impression, a brief analysis 
and the court’s conclusion.  It is intended to give only the briefest 
synopsis of the first impression issue, not a comprehensive analysis.  
This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will hopefully 
serve the reader well as a reference starting point.   
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FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
SKF USA Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 423 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Must “the distinction between domestic goods and gray 
market goods . . . be physical in nature in order to satisfy the ‘material 
difference test,’” thereby establishing a violation of trademark under § 
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930? Id. at 1313. 
ANALYSIS: Gray market goods “‘are defined as ‘genuine goods that 
. . . are of foreign manufacture, bearing a legally affixed foreign 
trademark that is the same mark as is registered in the United States; gray 
460 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 2:459 
goods are legally acquired abroad and then imported without the consent 
of the United States trademark holder.’” Id. at 1312 (quoting Gamut 
Trading Co. v. Int’l Trade Co., 200 F.3d 775, 778 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
Further, where there is a material difference between the goods of the 
U.S. trademark holder and the gray market goods bearing the same mark, 
there exists an infringement of the U.S. trademark. Id. at 1312-13. The 
Federal Circuit explained that the material difference test is used because 
gray market goods that lack certain characteristics associated with the 
goods of the U.S. trademark holder but bearing the same mark may lead 
consumers to believe that the goods “originated from the trademark 
owner . . . [thereby] damag[ing] the owner’s goodwill.” Id. at 1312. The 
court then noted that in prior cases on the subject, “material differences 
were found based in part on differences in services and guarantees 
between authorized and gray market goods, as well as accompanying 
documents such as instruction manuals, nonphysical traits that were 
nevertheless determined to constitute a material difference to 
consumers.” Id. at 1314. The Federal Circuit thus found the proposition 
that “nonphysical traits may constitute material differences [to be] 
consistent with [Federal Circuit] case law and [as promoting] the sound, 
established policies underlying trademark protection.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “[M]aterial differences need not be physical in order 
to establish trademark infringement in gray market cases.” Id. 
 
Saab Cars USA, Inc. v. United States, 434 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: What is “[t]he correct standard of review for a 
judgment issued on stipulated facts in lieu of trial”? Id. at 1371. 
ANALYSIS: The Federal Circuit stated that “in rendering judgment 
based upon stipulated facts, the trial judge of necessity draws – and bases 
legal conclusions on – factual inferences that would be impermissible in 
the summary judgment context under Rule 56.” Id. at 1372. In addition, 
“[a] trial court’s decision based upon stipulated facts resembles, in 
significant respects, a decision on the administrative record, which we 
have recently concluded is not akin to summary judgment.” Id.; see 
Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1353-57 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
CONCLUSION: The court stated that it will “review the trial court’s 
legal conclusions de novo.” Id. Further, the court will “review inferences 
it drew from the stipulated facts, and its application of the law to those 
facts, for clear error.” Id. 
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IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether a single claim covering both an apparatus 
and a method of use of that apparatus is invalid” in a patent infringement 
suit.  Id. at 1384. 
ANALYSIS: “The Board of Patent Appeals . . . has made it clear that 
reciting both an apparatus and a method of using that apparatus renders a 
claim indefinite under section 112, paragraph 2.” Id. The court ruled that, 
“such a claim ‘is not sufficiently precise to provide competitors with an 
accurate determination of the ‘metes and bounds of protection involved’ 
and is ‘ambiguous and properly rejected’ under section 112, paragraph 
2.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “Because [the claim] recites both a system and the 
method for using that system, it does not apprise a person of ordinary 
skill in the art of its scope, and it is invalid under section 112, paragraph 
2.” Id. (quoting Ex Parte David L. Lyell, 17 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1548, 1550-51 
(BPAI 1990).   
 
FIRST CIRCUIT 
United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Under what circumstances should an excited utterance 
made to a police officer be considered testimonial?” Id. at 55-56. 
ANALYSIS: First, the court reviewed the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), noting that the Court 
“decreed that, as to ‘testimonial’ statements, the Confrontation Clause 
assures a procedural right to confrontation rather than a substantive 
guarantee of evidentiary reliability.” Id. at 58. In that decision, the 
Supreme Court provided several examples that would qualify as 
“testimonial statements” and thus be inadmissible. One example the 
Court discussed was “statements that were made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial.” Id. at 59. After 
examining different ways to decide whether excited utterances can 
constitute testimonial hearsay, the 1st Circuit rejected a categorical 
approach that would either always permit or never allow excited 
utterances, and instead chose to take “an ad hoc, case-by-case approach.” 
Id. at 61. The circuit found that once a statement qualified as an excited 
utterance, “the court then must look to the attendant circumstances and 
assess the likelihood that a reasonable person would have either retained 
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or regained the capacity to make a testimonial statement at the time of 
the utterance.” Id. at 62. 
CONCLUSION: While the circumstances will vary from case to case, 
in “the circumstances at hand, the excited utterance was nontestimonial 
and, therefore, properly admitted into evidence.” Id. at 56. 
 
United States v. Martinez-Flores, 428 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether “the Congressional endorsement of downward 
sentencing [under the Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children 
Today Act (“Protect Act”), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003)] 
departures in conjunction with ‘fast-track’ case processing violate the 
nondelegation doctrine?” Id. at 24. 
ANALYSIS: Congress recently instructed the United States 
Sentencing Commission to add § 401(m)(2)(B) to the Protect Act, giving 
the Government authority to grant criminals prosecuted under the Act a 
four-level downward sentencing departure in exchange for their guilty 
pleas and waivers of rights to file motions and appeals. See id. at 26. This 
provision gives the Attorney General discretion to decide the 
circumstances under which he would authorize such a “fast-track” 
program. Id. at 25-26. The appellant argued that this provision is 
unconstitutional because it delegates too much legislative power to the 
Attorney General. Id. at 26. The 1st Circuit reasoned that “Congress 
created the Sentencing Commission and may constitutionally require the 
Commission to set sentencing policy.” Id. at 28. The court added, “[t]he 
fact that the new sentencing policy contains a condition that depends for 
its fulfillment on actions of the Attorney General does not mean 
Congress has delegated either Legislative or Judicial Branch power to the 
Attorney General.” Id. The court noted that the Attorney General does 
not have to act at all under this provision and that the authority given to 
the Attorney General under this provision is “‘no broader than the 
authority [prosecutors] routinely exercise in enforcing criminal laws.’” 
Id. at 28-29 (alteration in original). 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that § 401(m)(2)(B) of the 
Protect Act does not violate the nondelegation doctrine.  Id. at 24. 
 
In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: What is the “standard for determining whether a market 
was ‘efficient’ when applying the fraud-on-the-market presumption of 
investor reliance?” Id. at 1. 
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ANALYSIS: In a securities fraud action under § 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, reliance is a required element. Id. at 4. 
One theory that may be used to prove reliance is the fraud-on-the-market 
theory which permits “a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff relied 
on the ‘integrity of the market price’ which reflected that misstatement.” 
Id. at 5. In order to use the fraud-on-the-market theory, an investor must 
prove that the market is “efficient.” Id. The Supreme Court decision 
adopting the fraud-on-the-market theory, Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 
(1988), did not adopt any particular economic theory to use for 
determining if a market is efficient. Id. at 9. 
Most other circuits have adopted “a definition of market efficiency 
which requires that stock price fully reflect all publicly available 
information.” Id. This definition is also consistent with a pre-Basic 1st 
Circuit decision. Id. at 10 (citing Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 
22 (1st Cir. 1987)). Finally, the only alternative definition “allows some 
information to be considered ‘material’ and yet not affect market price.” 
Id. 
CONCLUSION: “An efficient market is one in which the market 
price of the stock fully reflects all publicly available information.” Id. at 
14. 
 
United States v. Rondeau, 430 F. 3d 44 (1st Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the Crawford rule, which generally precludes 
use of testimonial hearsay, applies in supervised release revocation 
proceedings. Id. at 47. 
ANALYSIS: “Nothing in Crawford indicates that the Supreme Court 
intended to extend the Confrontation Clause’s reach beyond the criminal 
prosecution context.” Id. The 1st Circuit joins the 6th, 8th, and 9th 
Circuits in concluding “a supervised release revocation hearing is not a 
‘criminal prosecution,’” therefore, Crawford does not apply. Id. at 48. 
CONCLUSION: The use of testimonial hearsay is permitted in a 
supervised release revocation hearing. Id. 
 
In re Antonio Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether there is an explicit waiver of sovereign 
immunity in 11 U.S.C. § 106, as to allow an award of emotional distress 
damages against the United States, under the sanctions provisions of 11 
U.S.C. § 105, to remedy a violation of 11 U.S.C. § 524, which enjoins 
actions to recover discharged debts.” Id. at 23. 
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ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that the standard for waiver 
is stringent, and “[a] waiver must be unequivocally expressed and must 
be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign with ambiguities construed 
against waiver.” Id. at 23-24 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
The court then found that “[t]here is no doubt that § 106 is an express 
waiver of sovereign immunity [but that] does not answer the question of 
what types of relief are encompassed in the waiver.” Id. at 24 (emphasis 
added). The 1st Circuit concluded that although the legislative history 
shows a waiver for monetary damages, “Congress has not ‘definitely and 
unequivocally’ waived sovereign immunity under § 106(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code for emotional damages awards in circumstances such 
as these.” Id. at 31. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “sovereign immunity bars 
awards for emotional distress damages against the federal government 
under § 105(a) for any willful violation of § 524, and that immunity is 
not waived by § 106.” Id. 
 
Powell v. United States, 430 F.3d 490 (1st Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether defendant’s conviction for eluding a police 
officer qualifies as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924, the Armed 
Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Id. at 491. 
ANALYSIS: The court analogized eluding a police officer to a prison 
escape. Id. Regarding the latter, the 1st Circuit had recently characterized 
a prison escape as similar to “a ‘powder keg,’ ready to explode into 
violence.” Id. (quoting United States v. Winn, 364 F.3d 7, 11-12 (1st Cir. 
2004). Furthermore, the court noted that a “consensus has emerged that 
evasive driving offenses, like prison escapes, constitute a category of 
‘violent crime’ within the meaning of the ACCA’s provision for ‘conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk to another.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Finally, the court reasoned that “high-speed car 
chases pose a grave threat of death and injury by collision, as well as 
escalated confrontations between suspects and police.” Id. at 492. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that defendant’s conviction for 
eluding police is a proper violent-crime predicate under the ACCA. Id. 
 
In re William Smith, 436 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the statute of limitations for “filing a habeas 
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 started to run when the Supreme Court 
denied” a petition for certiorari or when the Supreme Court denied a 
rehearing of that petition. Id. at 9-10. 
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ANALYSIS: The petitioner, a federal inmate convicted of being a 
felon in possession of a firearm sought an appeal of the district court’s 
denial of his habeas petition. Id. at 10. The 1st Circuit determined that 
“[a]lthough the statute itself does not define when a conviction becomes 
final for this purpose, every circuit that has addressed the issue has 
concluded that a conviction becomes final—and the one-year period 
therefore starts to run—when a petition for certiorari is denied.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit denied petitioner’s appeal and 
concluded that the one-year statute of limitations runs when the Supreme 
Court first denies certiorari. Id. at 11. 
 
United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “a federal district court, consistent with the 
teachings of United States v. Booker [may] impose a sentence outside the 
advisory guideline sentencing range based solely on its categorical 
rejection of the guidelines’ disparate treatment of offenses involving 
crack cocaine, on the one hand, and powdered cocaine, on the other 
hand.” Id. at 54 (citation omitted). 
ANALYSIS: In a consolidation of two appeals, the 1st Circuit found 
that “the lower court jettisoned the guidelines and constructed a new 
sentencing range by using a 20:1 crack-to-powder ratio in lieu of the 
100:1 ratio embedded in both the statutory scheme and the guidelines.” 
Id. at 62. Firmly articulating that “[m]atters of policy typically are for 
Congress,” the appellate court described the “decision to employ a 100:1 
crack-to-powder ratio rather than a 20:1 ratio, a 5:1 ratio, or a 1:1 ratio . . 
. a policy judgment, pure and simple.” Id. (citing United States v. 
Andrade, 94 F.3d 9, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1996)). The Sentencing Commission, 
by congressional edict, “is allied with Congress in the important 
endeavor of calibrating sentences for federal offenses” and “[n]othing in 
Booker altered this distribution of authority over sentencing policy.” Id. 
Thus, under Booker, “a district court may exercise discretion in 
fashioning sentences – but that discretion was meant to operate only 
within the ambit of the individualized factors spelled out in section 
3553(a).” Id. (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 
738, 764-66 (2005)). As such, “the district court’s categorical rejection 
of the 100:1 ratio impermissibly usurps Congress’s judgment about the 
proper sentencing policy for cocaine offenses.” Id. at 63. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “the district court erred as a 
matter of law when it constructed a new sentencing range based on the 
categorical substitution of a 20:1 crack-to-powder ratio for the 100:1 
ratio embedded in the sentencing guidelines. This holding recognize[d] 
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that sentencing decisions must be done case by case and must be 
grounded in case-specific considerations, not in general disagreement 
with broad-based policies enunciated by Congress or the Commission, as 
its agent.” Id. at 64-65. 
 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
M. Fortunoff of Westbury Corp. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 432 F.3d 127 (2d 
Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether 49 U.S.C. § 13906(a)(3) (2000 & Supp. 
2005), enacted as part of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
Termination Act of 1995 (“ICCTA” or “Termination Act”), Pub. L. No. 
104-88, 109 Stat. 803, to replace the Motor Carrier Act’s insurance 
provisions, allowed the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
(“FMCSA”) – the successor agency to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (“ICC”) in this area of regulation – to continue to 
distinguish between types of motor carriage when requiring cargo 
liability insurance.” Id. at 129. 
ANALYSIS: “Prior to 1995 the Motor Carrier Act distinguished 
between two different types of motor carriers: motor common carriers 
and motor contract carriers.” Id. at 130 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 10102(15)-
(16) (1994)). The ICC issued separate regulations for each type, 
including different insurance requirements. Id. at 130-31. Under the 
ICCTA the distinction between the types of carriers was abolished, 
however, pursuant to the “transition rule” in 49 U.S.C. § 13902(d) 
(2000), the FMCSA “continued to register transportation providers as 
‘common carriers’ and ‘contract carriers.’” Id. at 133. Congress had, 
however, clearly intended to abolish separate categories for motor 
carriers. Id. at 136. Congress left to the discretion of the Secretary of 
Transportation the decision to require cargo liability insurance. Id. at 
137. This incorporation of discretion allows the Secretary to require that 
motor carriers have cargo insurance and to require that some carry 
insurance while others do not. Id. at 138. 
CONCLUSION: 49 U.S.C. § 13906(a)(3) “gives the FMCSA 
‘discretion to require cargo liability insurance for some types of motor 
carriage and not others, and that the agency’s discretion is entitled to 
deference.” Id. at 130. 
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Bus. and Residents Alliance of East Harlem v. Jackson, 430 F.3d 584 
(2d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether the [New York City Empowerment] Zone’s 
subsequent use . . . of federal funds in connection with individual 
projects triggers the historic preservation preview process, as set forth in 
§ 106 of the National Historical Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 407(f).” 
Id. at 586. 
ANALYSIS: Section 106 is triggered only when a federal agency has 
jurisdiction or licensing authority over the project at issue. Id. In the case 
of the Zone, all approval and funding decisions as to the East River Plaza 
project are made at the state and local level. Id. Therefore, § 106 is not 
triggered, and thus construction of the East River Plaza project can move 
forward with construction without undergoing a historical preservation 
review process. Id. at 594. 
CONCLUSION: Section 106 is inapplicable here, thus, the historical 
preservation review process is not triggered. Id.  
 
In re Smart World Techs., L.L.C., 423 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the bankruptcy court erred in granting 
creditor-appellees standing to pursue settlement of an adversary 
proceeding under FED. R. BANK. P. 9019 without the participation of, 
and over objections of, the debtor-in-possession. Id. at 174-75. 
ANALYSIS: The court looked at the plain language of the rule as 
well as policy considerations and determined that the rule permits only 
the debtor-in-possession to move for settlement. Id. at 175. However, the 
court noted that certain limited circumstances allow settlement of a claim 
over the objections of the debtor-in-possession, such as aggrieved 
creditors or other parties dissatisfied with the conduct of a debtor-in-
possession who appoints a trustee or examiner who then brings the 
motion. Id. at 175-76. However, those circumstances were not present in 
this case. Id. at 176. The court also held that only in rare circumstances 
may the doctrine of derivative standing be appropriate in the rule 9019 
context if unjustifiable behavior exists on the part of the debtor-in-
possession, however, those circumstances also were not present in this 
case. Id. at 177. Finally, the court held that the power granted under 11 
U.S.C. § 105 does not provide the bankruptcy court with an independent 
basis to grant standing. Id. at 184. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that certain circumstances authorize 
parties other than the debtors-in-possession to pursue a rule 9019 motion 
in a bankruptcy proceeding, however, those circumstances were not 
present in this case. Id. at 184. 
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Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) retroactively restricts 
deportation relief under section 212(h) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”), codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), for 
offenses committed by an alien prior to the statute’s enactment. Id at 129. 
ANALYSIS: The court applied a line of case law relating to the 
effect of IIRIRA and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(“AEDPA”) to a similar section of the INA which held that no 
retroaction will apply unless there is clear language by Congress to the 
contrary. Id. at 129. In the event that the language is ambiguous, courts 
must determine whether applying the statute retroactively “would change 
the legal consequences of past events;” in which case the courts would 
find a presumption against retroactivity. Id. at 130. The court then 
concluded that section 348(a) clearly demonstrated that Congress 
intended the provisions of IIRIRA to apply retroactively to aliens in 
deportation proceedings after IIRIRA’s enactment regardless of when the 
offense occurred and that the restriction shall apply to aliens convicted of 
the offense of “aggravated felonies” regardless of when the offense 
occurred. Id. at 131. 
CONCLUSION: The court ultimately held that Congress’s 
unambiguous intent shows that IIRIRA shall apply retroactively to 
offenses committed before the statute’s enactment. Id. at 129. 
 
De La Vega v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether this Court has jurisdiction to review a 
denial by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) of a petitioner’s 
request for cancellation of removal on the basis of its finding that the 
petitioner failed to demonstrate that his removal would cause 
‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ to a qualifying U.S. citizen 
relative.” Id. at 141. 
ANALYSIS: The court joined five sister courts in finding “the BIA’s 
discretionary determinations concerning whether to grant cancellation of 
removal [to] constitute “judgment[s] regarding the granting of relief 
under section 1229b” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) 
and therefore the review of such determinations falls outside [its] 
jurisdiction.” Id. at 144. The court went on to find that “the BIA’s 
judgment that an alien has failed to demonstrate that his removal will 
cause a qualifying U.S. citizen relative to suffer ‘exceptional and 
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extremely unusual hardship’ is discretionary” not only because all circuit 
courts confronted with the issue had answered in the positive, but also 
because “cases construing the scope of appellate jurisdiction to review 
BIA denials of ‘suspension of deportation’–the predecessor to 
‘cancellation of removal’–under the prior, “extreme hardship” statutory 
formulation” regard such determinations as discretionary. Id. at 144-45. 
CONCLUSION: The court ultimately made two finding: “(1) 
‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ determinations by the BIA 
are discretionary judgments and (2) we therefore lack jurisdiction to 
review such judgments, in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).” 
Id. at 145-46. 
 
Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a New York City licensing requirement is 
“narrowly tailored in its application to . . . vendors of regular 
merchandise with sufficient expressive content to qualify for First 
Amendment protection.” Id. at 102. 
ANALYSIS: “[W]hether a regulation is narrowly-tailored can only 
be determined upon a context-specific inquiry.” Id. at 102.  The 2nd 
Circuit further explained that “New York City’s licensing requirement is 
clearly a content-neutral speech restriction because it ‘serves purposes 
unrelated to the content of [the regulated] expression,’ namely: (1) 
keeping the public streets free of congestion for the convenience and 
safety of its citizens, (2) maintaining the ‘tax base and economic viability 
of the City,’ and (3) preventing the sale of ‘stolen, defective or 
counterfeit merchandises.’” Id. at 99 (citing Hobbs v. County of 
Westchester, 397 F.3d 133, 150 (2d. Cir. 2005); Mastrovincenzo v. City 
of New York, 313 F. Supp. 2d 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). Merely 
because “New York City differentiates between categories of vendors—
that is, vendors of written materials, paintings, photographs, prints and 
sculptures are exempt from its licensing requirement while other vendors 
are not—does not suggest that the City’s regulation targets particular 
messages and favors others.” Id. In addition, the court noted, “[the 
regulation] in no way precludes plaintiffs from reaching public audiences 
on the sidewalks generally or in any of the specific venues where they 
currently hawk their wares.” Id. at 101. Despite the regulation, “plaintiffs 
have numerous alternative channels through which to share their art with 
the public.” Id. The court held that “the alternative avenues of 
communication available to plaintiffs, taken together, [were] more than 
‘ample.’” Id. at 102. 
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CONCLUSION: Thus, “notwithstanding Bery v. City of New York, 97 
F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996), [the licensing requirement was] sufficiently 
narrowly tailored to satisfy intermediate scrutiny.” Id. 
 
THIRD CIRCUIT 
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d 
Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the nominative fair use defense is recognized 
in the 3rd Circuit in an action for trademark infringement. Id. at 218. 
ANALYSIS: As an issue of first impression in the 3rd Circuit, the 
court disagreed with the 9th Circuit, which had denounced the 
“likelihood of confusion” test. Id. at 220. The 3rd Circuit, while agreeing 
“with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that a distinct analysis is 
needed for nominative fair use cases,” concluded that the “likelihood of 
confusion” test should not be completely supplanted. Id. Thus, the court 
“disagree[d] with the fundamental distinction the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals drew between classic and nominative fair use” and instead, set 
forth a two-step approach of its own. Id. at 221-22. “The plaintiff must 
first prove that confusion is likely due to the defendant’s use of 
plaintiff’s mark. . . . Once plaintiff has met its burden of proving that 
confusion is likely, the burden then shifts to defendant to show that its 
nominative use of plaintiff’s mark is nonetheless fair. Id. at 222.  “To 
demonstrate fairness, the defendant must satisfy a three-pronged 
nominative fair use test, derived to a great extent from the one articulated 
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Under our fairness test, a 
defendant must show: (1) that the use of plaintiff’s mark is necessary to 
describe both the plaintiff’s product or service and the defendant’s 
product or service; (2) that the defendant uses only so much of the 
plaintiff’s mark as is necessary to describe plaintiff’s product; and (3) 
that the defendant’s conduct or language reflect the true and accurate 
relationship between plaintiff and defendant’s products or services.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “We hold today that the burden of proving 
likelihood of confusion, even in a nominative use case, should remain 
with the plaintiff.” Id. at 226. 
 
McGowan v. NJR Service Corp., 423 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Are “the administrators of a retirement plan that is 
covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
2006] First Impressions 471 
(‘ERISA’) . . . required to recognize an individual’s waiver of her 
beneficiary interest under the plan?” Id. at 243. 
ANALYSIS: Title 29 of U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) “dictates that it is 
the documents on file with the Plan, and not outside private agreements 
between beneficiaries and participants, that determine the rights of the 
parties.” Id. at 245-46. Thus, “any requirement imposed on Plan 
administrators to look beyond these documents would go against the 
specific command of § 1104(a)(1)(D).” Id. at 246. “‘[O]ne of the 
principal goals underlying ERISA . . . [is] ensuring that ‘plans be 
uniform in their interpretation and simple in their application.’” Id. 
(quoting McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 312 (6th Cir. 1990)). “This 
extremely important policy goal is best served by the conclusion that, 
under § 1104(a)(1)(D), outside waivers are not binding on Plan 
administrators.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “Plan administrators are not required to look beyond 
Plan documents to determine whether a waiver has been effectuated in a 
private agreement between the participant and his [or her] named 
beneficiary.” Id. at 242. 
 
Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694 (3d Cir. 
2005) 
FIRST QUESTION: “Whether a court should look to prevailing rates 
in the attorney’s home community or the locus of the litigation in 
determining the appropriate compensation for an out-of-town attorney.” 
Id. at 705. 
ANALYSIS: The court first looked to one of its previous decisions, 
In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984), where 
the court “held that it was error for a district court to apply ‘hypothetical 
national rates’ in determining the size of a fee award.” Id. at 705. The 
court looked to the recommendation of a task force it commissioned two 
decades earlier which recommended a “forum rate” rule whereby an 
“out-of-town lawyer would receive not the hourly rate prescribed by his 
district but rather the hourly rate prevailing in the forum in which the 
litigation is lodged.” Id. at 704. The court found that while in most cases 
a “forum rate” should apply, there were “two exceptions: first ‘when the 
need for the special expertise of counsel from a distant district is shown’; 
and, second, ‘when local counsel are unwilling to handle the case.’” Id. 
at 705. 
CONCLUSION: The “district courts in the Third Circuit should 
award attorney fees based on the ‘forum rate’ rule as set forth in the Task 
Force Report.” Id. at 705. 
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SECOND QUESTION: “Whether a prevailing party is entitled to 
compensation for the costs of non-testifying experts under a fee-shifting 
statute.” Id. at 715. 
ANALYSIS: The court reviewed decisions in both the D.C. Circuit 
and the 11th Circuit, but found none to be entirely on point. Id. at 715-
16. Instead, the court looked to the Supreme Court decision in Missouri 
v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989), where the Court found “the phrase 
‘reasonable attorney’s fee’ can encompass work performed by 
individuals who are not attorneys.” Id. at 716. The Supreme Court 
continued that “[r]ather, the term must refer to a reasonable fee for the 
work product of an attorney.” Id. The 3rd Circuit reasoned that “[t]o 
forbid the shifting of the expert’s fee would encourage 
underspecialization and inefficient trial preparation, just as to forbid 
shifting the cost of paralegals would encourage lawyers to do paralegals 
work.” Id. Concurring with the 7th Circuit, the 3rd Circuit noted that 
“prohibiting reimbursement for the fees of non-testifying experts would 
simply encourage attorneys to educate themselves, undoubtedly at higher 
costs.” Id. at 716-17. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit concluded that “a prevailing party is 
entitled to compensation for the costs of non-testifying experts under a 
fee-shifting statute.” Id. at 715. 
 
Garcia v. Plaza Oldsmobile Ltd., 421 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the court should use Pennsylvania common 
law or New York’s statutory law to determine if [defendant-owner, a 
New York corporation with its principal place of business in that state] 
can be liable” for the acts of a New York citizen-driver who injured a 
Pennsylvania citizen in Pennsylvania while driving a rented motor 
vehicle from defendant corporation. Id. at 219. 
ANALYSIS: In “exercise[ing] plenary review over the choice of law 
question raised in this appeal,” the court first noted that it must apply the 
choice-of-law rules of the jurisdiction in which the district court sits, here 
Pennsylvania. Id. Subsequently, pursuant to Pennsylvania law, the court 
must determine what type of “conflict” exists between the purported 
competing bodies of law before assessing the governmental interests of 
the jurisdictions whose law may control, and examine those contacts 
within the dispute. Id. An “‘interest analysis’ . . . determine[s] whether 
the case involves a true or false conflict or whether it is unprovided for.” 
Id. at 220. In conducting this analysis, the court found that the case 
presented a false conflict because “there is a true conflict [only] ‘when 
the governmental interest of both jurisdictions would be impaired if their 
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law were not applied.’” Id. (citing Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 
F.2d 170, 187 & n.15 (3d Cir. 1991)). In cases of “false conflict, [courts] 
apply the law of the only interested jurisdiction.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court determined that the case presented “a 
false conflict” because “applying New York law to impose liability [on 
the defendant] does not impair the interests of Pennsylvania, while on the 
contrary, the application of Pennsylvania law would impair New York’s 
interest in providing injured plaintiffs with a financially responsible 
defendant, and imposing a high degree of responsibility on the owners of 
vehicle[s].” Id. at 223. Thus, the 3rd Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment in finding that the law of the interested 
jurisdiction, here New York, should apply. Id. at 223-224. 
 
Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the participation clause of section 704(a) 
[of Title VII] protects an employee who files a facially invalid claim for 
retaliatory discharge.” Id. at 266. 
ANALYSIS: Slagle alleged that he was terminated from his position 
as a Corrections Officer because of “unlawful retaliation in violation of 
Title VII.” Id. at 264. The district court granted summary judgment 
holding that Slagle had failed to “establish that he engaged in protected 
activity, which is an essential element of a prima facie case of retaliation 
under Title VII.” Id. The court noted that a “plaintiff need only allege 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
to be protected from retaliatory discharge under Title VII. Protection is 
not lost merely because an employee is mistaken on the merits of his or 
her claim.” Id. at 268. However, the court continued, “Slagle’s 
complaint, with its vague allegations of ‘civil rights’ violations, did not 
meet even this low bar.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit, consistent with the 4th and 9th 
Circuits, held that “we cannot dispense with the requirement that the 
plaintiff allege prohibited grounds” to constitute a valid retaliatory claim 
under Title VII. Id. at 267. 
 
FOURTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. Amaya-Portillo, 423 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: The Fourth Circuit looked at “whether a state 
conviction for possession of cocaine can ultimately qualify as an 
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‘aggravated felony’ under section 2L1.2 [of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines] if it is [classified as] a misdemeanor under the applicable 
state law and punishable only as a misdemeanor under the Controlled 
Substances Act (“CSA”), 21 U.S.C. § 801.” Id. at 430-31. 
ANALYSIS: The statutory language of the Sentencing Guidelines, § 
2L1.2(b)(1)(C) is evidence that “Congress did not intend for the same 
definition of ‘felony’ as a crime punishable by more than one year of 
imprisonment to apply” to felony drug offenses punishable under the 
CSA. Id. at 432. The court found compelling that Congress could have 
but ultimately did not define a “‘drug trafficking crime’ as a drug offense 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.” Id. at 435. The 
court also found persuasive arguments from “seven other circuits, each 
of which conducted the ‘aggravated felony’ inquiry by focusing upon the 
‘classification’ of an offense under state law rather than upon potential 
punishment.” Id. at 432. The court noted that it applied the analysis it 
used in a similar case, in essence rejecting the rule adopted by the 6th 
and 9th Circuits. Id. at 430, 435. 
CONCLUSION: Under Maryland law, although the defendant’s 
offense carried a possible sentence of more than one year imprisonment, 
it is classified as a misdemeanor. Id. at 428. In addition, possession of 
cocaine “is neither classified as a felony by Federal or Maryland law [but 
is classified as a misdemeanor] . . . the offense is not a ‘felony’ under 21 
U.S.C. § 802(13), nor an ‘aggravated felony’ under section 2L1.2 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines.” Id. at 435. Ultimately, the court “conclude[d] 
that a ‘felony’ under the CSA means ‘any Federal or State offense 
classified by applicable Federal or [State] law as a felony.” Id. In doing 
so, the court deferred “to a state’s judgment, not as to the appropriate 
punishment, but as to whether the offense is a felony.” Id. 
 
United States v. Fitzgerald, 435 F.3d 484 (4th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the application of 18 U.S.C. § 3147 can 
enhance a sentence for the crime of failing to appear at a criminal 
sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3146. Id. at 486. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “[u]nder § 3147, a person who is 
convicted of committing an offense while on release . . . ‘shall be 
sentenced, in addition to the sentence prescribed for the offense to (1) a 
term of imprisonment of not more than ten years imprisonment if the 
offense is a felony . . .’ [that] ‘incorporates this provision . . . by 
requiring a three-level increase to the base offense level when . . . § 3147 
is applicable.’” Id. at 485. (quoting United States v. Kincaid, 964 F.2d 
325, 327 (4th Cir. 1992)). 
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CONCLUSION: The court held that “the plain language of § 3147 
provides for the district court’s enhancement of [the defendant’s] 
sentence.”  Id. at 487. Because Double Jeopardy does not apply to this 
sentence, it was affirmed. Id. 
 
FIFTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. Jackson, 426 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2005)                                 
QUESTION: “[W]hether incarceration for a parole violation that was 
later held unconstitutional by a state court tolls the defendant’s period of 
supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (2005).” Id. at 301. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by looking to the plain 
language of the statute. Id. at 304. The language is clear: “the period of 
supervised release does not run during imprisonment.” Id. If 
incarceration reduced the period of supervised release, the rehabilitative 
objectives of that program would be void. Id. at 305. 
CONCLUSION: Thus, the court held that “[the defendant’s] prior 
incarceration tolled his supervised release and thereby extended the 
period he must submit to supervised release.” Id. at 302. 
 
Caldwell v. Dretke, 429 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether orders of deferred adjudication community 
supervision and straight probation are final judgments for purposes of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) one-
year statute of limitations.” Id. at 522. 
ANALYSIS: In this case, orders of deferred adjudication were 
entered against petitioners after they pled guilty to various crimes. Id. at 
523-25. Petitioners filed habeas petitions more than one year after the 
entry of these judgments. Id. Lower courts held that petitioners’ habeas 
petitions were time barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. 
Id. The court explained that AEDPA mandates that “‘an application for a 
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of 
a State court’ be filed within one-year of ‘the date on which the judgment 
became final.’” Id. at 525. In reasoning that deferred adjudications are 
final judgments, the court noted that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure defines them as such; they are appealable; and treating 
them as final judgments fulfills the congressional intent in passing the 
one-year statute of limitations to “‘curb the abuse of the statutory writ of 
habeas corpus’” which applies to habeas petitions. Id. 527-28 (quoting 
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H.R. Rep. No. 104-518, at 111 (1996)). The court added that the deferred 
adjudication became final “by the conclusion of direct review or the 
expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Id. at 529. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the “orders of deferred 
adjudication . . . and straight probation are final judgments for purposes 
of [AEDPA’s] one-year statute of limitations.” Id. at 523. 
 
Praylor v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 430 F.3d 1208 (5th Cir. 
2005) 
QUESTION: Whether a prison’s decision to decline “to provide a 
transsexual with hormone treatment amounts to acting with deliberate 
indifference to a serious medical need.” Id. at 1209. 
ANALYSIS: Relying on three other circuit decisions (White v. 
Farrier, 849 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1988); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 
408 (7th Cir. 1987); and Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 
1986)) the 5th Circuit found that the prison’s medical analysis was 
considerate and thorough. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the “refusal to provide hormone 
therapy [for incarcerated transsexuals] did not constitute” deliberate 
indifference. Id. 
 
United States v. Burns, 433 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether an otherwise valid appeal waiver is rendered 
invalid, or inapplicable to an appeal seeking to raise a Booker or Fanfan 
issue, merely because the waiver was made before Booker. Id. 
ANALYSIS: A waiver of a right to appeal must be voluntary, 
knowing and intelligent with “sufficient awareness of the relevant 
circumstances and likely consequences.” Id. at 449 (citing Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)). The validity of the waiver is 
determined by the totality of the circumstances. Id. In Brady, the 
petitioner argued that a statute, which was later held unconstitutional, 
coerced his guilty plea. Id. (citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 743-44). The 
Supreme Court rejected that contention, holding that “‘absent 
misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents,’” the 
waiver is valid. Id. (quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 757). Other circuits have 
rejected the argument that a defendant’s waiver of appeal prior to Booker 
does not render such waiver invalid while relying on Brady. Id. 
CONCLUSION: “[A]n otherwise valid appeal waiver is not rendered 
invalid, or inapplicable to an appeal seeking to raise a Booker or Fanfan 
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issue . . . merely because the waiver was made before Booker.” Id. at 
450. 
 
United States v. Arbizu, 431 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether failure to provide written notice of the terms 
of supervised release automatically invalidates a revocation of such 
release if the defendant received actual notice of the conditions.” Id. at 
470. 
ANALYSIS: “The purpose of §§ 3583(f) and 3603(1) is to ensure 
that the defendant is notified of the conditions of his supervised release. 
Congress decided that requiring the probation officer to provide the 
defendant with written notice of the conditions is the best way to ensure 
the defendant knows what is expected of him during the supervised 
release periods. It would be patently unfair to revoke a defendant’s 
supervised release and send him back to prison for violating conditions 
of the release that he had no way of knowing existed.” Id. at 471. The 5th 
Circuit followed the reasoning and conclusion of the 1st, 8th, and 9th 
Circuits on this issue. Id. at 470. 
CONCLUSION: The “[g]overnment’s failure to provide the notice 
required by the statutes does not limit the district court’s authority to 
revoke supervised release where the defendant had actual notice of the 
release terms.” Id. 
 
Withhart v. Otto Candies, L.L.C., 431 F.3d 840 (5th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: The court considered “whether a shipowner-employer 
may assert a negligence and indemnity claim against its seaman-
employee for property damage allegedly caused by the employee’s 
negligence.” Id. at 841. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the employer’s claims “are 
consistent with general maritime law.” Id. at 842. The court reasoned that 
the “Federal Employer’s Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, et 
seq., and consequently, the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. App. § 688, contain[ed] 
no prohibition against a general maritime negligence and indemnity 
claim by a ship-owner employee against its seaman-employee for 
property damage.” Id. at 841. 
CONCLUSION: Ultimately, the court held that the shipowner-
employer could assert a claim against an employee for property damage 
arising from the employee’s negligence. Id. 
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United States v. Adair, 436 F.3d 520 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the court should remand for resentencing a 
case in which the district court imposed a lower alternative sentence 
based on belief that the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), may have invalidated the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 528. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit explained that Blakely does apply to the 
sentencing guidelines in the sense that it establishes that “it violates a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury for a judge to 
enhance a sentence based on facts neither admitted by the defendant nor 
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 242-43 (2005)). However, the court also found 
that “there is nothing in the record to suggest that the district court 
anticipated Booker’s remedial holding [which made the sentencing 
guidelines advisory] and considered the sentencing guidelines as one 
factor among others listed in 18 U.S. C. § 3553(a).” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The district court’s decision to impose the 
alternative sentence is invalid under Supreme Court precedent and the 
sentencing guidelines. Id. at 529. 
 
Mello v. Sara Lee Corp., 431 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Is ERISA-estoppel a cognizable legal theory?” Id.  at 
444. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit joined the majority of circuits in 
“explicitly adopting ERISA-estoppel as a cognizable theory.” Id. The 
court held that “[t]o establish an ERISA-estoppel claim, the plaintiff 
must establish: (1) a material misrepresentation; (2) reasonable and 
detrimental reliance upon the representation; and (3) extraordinary 
circumstances.” Id. “Plaintiffs are able to satisfy the material 
misrepresentation element if their employers misrepresented any 
pertinent information.” Id. at 445. The court noted that, “material 
misrepresentations can be made in informal documents.” Id. The 5th 
Circuit held that, “it was unreasonable for Mello to rely on Sara Lee’s 
informal material misrepresentations regarding his benefits and Mello 
cannot establish his estoppel claim. ERISA’s policy against informal 
modifications of plan terms precludes a finding that Mello reasonably 
relied on the benefit statements’ pension amounts.” Id. 
 CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit adopted ERISA-estoppel but 
“[b]ecause Mello has not satisfied the reasonable reliance, he cannot 
establish that ERISA-estoppel should be applied to preclude Sara Lee 
from correcting the amount of his pension benefits.” Id. at 448. 
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SIXTH CIRCUIT 
Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, L.P., 423 F.3d 539 
(6th Cir. 2005). 
QUESTION: May the “initial-interest-confusion” doctrine be used as 
a substitute for actual confusion in order to find infringement of a 
trademark on a product’s shape? Id. at 551. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit began by explaining that “[i]nitial-
interest confusion takes place when a manufacturer improperly uses a 
trademark to create initial customer interest in a product, even if the 
customer realizes, prior to purchase, that the product was not actually 
manufactured by the trademark holder.” Id. at 549. The court then noted 
that “[t]he potential ramifications of applying this judicially created 
doctrine to product-shape trademarks are different from the ramifications 
of applying the doctrine to trademarks on a product’s name, a company’s 
name, or a company’s logo.” Id. at 551 n.15. For the court, these 
ramifications included allowing “trademark holders to protect not only 
the actual product shapes they have trademarked, but also a ‘penumbra’ 
of more or less similar shapes that would not otherwise qualify for 
trademark protection.” Id. Another ramification the court highlighted was 
the potential for anticompetitive behavior based on the fact that allowing 
initial-interest-confusion to apply in the context of a product’s shape 
“would make it substantially easier for product-shape trademark-holders 
to survive a defendant’s summary-judgment motion than for plaintiffs 
alleging any other type of trademark infringement.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: Based on these concerns, the 6th Circuit would not 
“go so far as to hold that there is never a circumstance in which it would 
be appropriate to apply the initial-interest-confusion doctrine to a product 
shape trademark.” Id. However, the court did not find that such an 
allowance would be appropriate in this case. Id. 
 
Brumbalough v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc., 427 F.3d 996 (6th Cir. 
2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether a plaintiff is able to recover compensatory 
damages for emotional distress” that resulted from an employment 
termination in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(“FMLA”). Id. at 1007. 
ANALYSIS: “[T]he FMLA specifically lists the types of damages 
that an employer may be liable for, and it includes damages only insofar 
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as they are the actual monetary losses of the employee such as salary and 
benefits and certain liquidated damages, the FMLA does not permit 
recovery for emotional distress.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “damages for emotional distress 
are not allowed under the FMLA.” Id. at 1008. 
 
Andretti v. Borla Performance Indus., 426 F.3d 824 (6th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether this court should apply the clear error or de 
novo standard to review offers of judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 68  
Id. at 837. 
ANALYSIS: The court considered decisions in the 3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th, 
10th and 11th Circuits and concluded that it “should apply general 
contract principles to interpret Rule 68 offers of judgment.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court decided to “review de novo the legal 
interpretations of Rule 68 and review for clear error the factual findings 
concerning the circumstances under which Rule 68 offers were made.” 
Id. 
 
United States v. McClain, 430 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: How should the court reconcile the good faith 
exception for the exclusion of evidence, as established in Leon, with the 
“fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine from Nardone? Id. at 307. 
ANALYSIS: After holding that a police search was unconstitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment, the court had to determine if warrants 
derived from this unconstitutional search were also illegal. Id. The 9th 
and 11th Circuits had found that any good faith on behalf of investigators 
did not sanitize the results of a warrantless search. Id. The 2nd and 8th 
Circuits had held, in some circumstances, the opposite view. The 8th 
Circuit found the Leon exception applicable “when circumstances 
surrounding both the initial detention of [evidence] and the subsequent 
issuance of the warrant were ‘sufficiently close to the line of validity’ 
that the officers had ‘an objectively reasonable belief that they possessed 
a reasonable suspicion such as would support the valid detention of [the 
evidence] as well as an objectively reasonable belief that the warrant 
issued was valid.” Id. at 308 (quoting United States v. Fletcher, 91 F.3d 
48, 51-52 (8th Cir. 1996)). 
CONCLUSION: The court determined that although there was a prior 
Fourth Amendment violation, the good faith exception should apply, and 
the evidence was improperly excluded at the trial court. Id. at 309. “The 
exclusion of evidence will not further the purposes of the exclusionary 
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rule ‘when an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a 
search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope.’” 
Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984)). 
 
Reeb v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 435 F.3d 639 (6th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether Title VII plaintiffs can bring a class action 
for injunctive or declaratory relief in the same action that seeks 
compensatory damages under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).” Id. at 653 
(Keith, J., dissenting). 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, (1982), required 
plaintiffs requesting class certification in Title VII cases “to allege 
‘significant proof’ that [a company] operated under a general policy of 
gender discrimination that resulted in gender discrimination manifesting 
itself in ‘the same general fashion’’ as to each of the kinds of 
discriminatory treatment upon which the pattern-or-practice class action 
rests.” Id. at 644 (quoting Reeb v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 81 
F.App’x 550, 559 (6th Cir. 2003). The court discussed the 5th Circuit’s 
holding in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., which found that “claims 
for individual compensatory and punitive damages were very 
particularized inquiries . . . [thus,] the damages were not ‘incidental’ to 
the requested injunctive or declaratory relief.” Id. at 648 (quoting Allison 
v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 414-15 (5th Cir.1998)). This 
contrasts with the 2nd and 9th Circuits, which found that a court could, 
in its discretion, certify a class action under Title VII despite claims for 
compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 648-49. 
CONCLUSION: The court followed Allison and held that “because 
of the individualized nature of damages calculations . . . the claims for 
individual compensatory damages of members of a Title VII class 
necessarily predominate over requested declaratory or injunctive relief, 
and individual compensatory damages [were] not recoverable by a Rule 
23(b)(2) class.” Id. at 651. 
 
Patel v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the elimination of the 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) 
waiver for parents of United States citizens has a retroactive effect.  Id. at 
690. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[o]nly . . . the Ninth and Fourth 
Circuits have addressed this issue” and both held that the waiver does not 
have a retroactive affect.” Id. In addition, the court discussed the 
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Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). Id. “In 
St. Cyr, the Supreme Court held that IIRIRA’s elimination of [a] 
discretionary waiver . . . had a retroactive effect as applied to [specific] 
persons . . .” Id. at 690-91. The 6th Circuit, however, “limit[s] the 
application of St. Cyr to aliens who plead guilty to removable offenses 
prior to the enactment of IIRIRA regardless of when the removable 
offenses occurred.” Id. at 691. The 6th Circuit also recognized that 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(i) was “not intended to apply retroactively.” Id. 
Ultimately, the court explained that the Landgraf factors “weigh against 
finding a retroactive effect” on the petitioners. Id. (citing Landgraf v. Usi 
Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269-70 (1994)). 
CONCLUSION: “[T]he application of [8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)] . . . does 
not have a retroactive effect, the IJ properly applied the current version 
[8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)].” Id. at 689. 
 
Bowles v. Russell, 432 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Where a petitioner does not receive timely notice of a 
district court’s final ruling, thus foreclosing the petitioner’s ability to file 
a timely appeal, may the petitioner seek relief and obtain a fourteen-day 
extension under FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6)? Id. at 669-70. If, in such a 
situation, the district court grants the “requested relief but mistakenly 
offer[s] an erroneous deadline” for filing of an appeal, should the 
erroneous deadline control, or is the fourteen-day period set out under 
Rule 4(a)(6) “not susceptible to extension through mistake, courtesy, or 
grace[?]” Id. at 669. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit stated that for the extension beyond the 
fourteen-day period set out under Rule 4(a)(6) to control it would need to 
satisfy the test established by the Supreme Court in Osterneck v. Ernst & 
Whinney, 489 U.S. 169 (1989). Id. at 657. The 6th Circuit stated that 
under the Osterneck test, such an extension would be applicable “‘only 
where a party has performed an act which, if properly done, would 
postpone the deadline for filing his appeal and has received specific 
assurance by a judicial officer that this act has been properly done.’” Id. 
The 6th Circuit found that petitioner’s situation did not fit within the 
Osterneck test for three reasons. Id. “First, petitioner’s act did not 
attempt to postpone a deadline for filing his appeal; it was to move for 
reopening of the appeal period.” Id. “Second, it was, in fact, the district 
court here that performed the improper act . . . [and clearly] the district 
court is not a party.” Id. Third, the Osterneck rule “requires that judicial 
assurances follow the actions of the party. Here, in contrast, the judicial 
assurance precedes the party’s act.” Id. 
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CONCLUSION: Where a district court erroneously extends the time 
to file a timely notice of appeal beyond fourteen days, it is the fourteen-
day period set out under Rule 4(a)(6) that controls, and not the erroneous 
judicial order. Id. at 669-676. 
 
United States v. Blood, 435 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: What is “the meaning of the phrase ‘with intent to 
deceive another’ found in 18 U.S.C. § 513(a), which prohibits possession 
of counterfeit and forged securities with this deceptive intent.” Id. at 616. 
ANALYSIS: The defendants argued that the word “another” meant 
an entity other than the one which issued the security. Id. at 618-19. The 
court disagreed with the defendant’s reading of United States v. Thomas, 
54 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1995). The Thomas court, in the view of the 6th 
Circuit, held that the word “another” did include the issuer of the 
security. Id. at 619. The 6th Circuit agreed with the conclusion that 
“another” included the issuer of the security by contrasting the use of the 
word “another” in the statute with the word “whoever.” Id. Thus, where 
the statute says that “whoever” engages in the prohibited act “with intent 
to deceive another,” the word “another” means one other than the 
individual committing the prohibited act. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The word “another” includes “the intent to deceive 
the purported issuers of the fraudulent securities in question.” Id. at 622. 
 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Illinois Dep’t of Revenue v. Hayslett/Judy Oil, Inc., 426 F.3d 899 (7th 
Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether the Illinois Motor Fuel Tax falls under [11 
U.S.C.] § 507(a)(8)(C) or § 507(a)(8)(E).” Id. at 902. 
ANALYSIS: The 7th Circuit noted that to determine “whether a tax 
falls within the purview of subsection C” the court must decide whether 
“the tax is imposed on the consumer or the retailer.” Id. at 903. “The 
Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that a prior version of the Tax was 
assessed on the consumer and not the distributor.” Id. at 904. The 7th 
Circuit then noted that “[t]he plain language of the statute itself leads to 
the same conclusion.” Id. The court found that the tax met a two-part test 
for inclusion under subsection C that it had previously established. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit found that because the defendant 
collected taxes from consumers, even though it “may be an excise tax,” it 
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was “an excise tax imposed on consumers that is collected by a third 
party” and that it accordingly should fall under § 507(a)(8)(C). Id. at 
904-05. 
 
United States v. McKissic, 428 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether constructive notice is enough warning when a 
court wishes to impose special conditions of education, employment and 
community service requirements for the supervised release of an inmate. 
Id. at 725. 
ANALYSIS: The 7th Circuit determined that special conditions at 
issue were listed among the discretionary conditions that may be 
imposed by the court, under 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b). Id. Agreeing with the 
5th, 9th, and 10th Circuits, the 7th Circuit held that constructive notice 
was adequate for conditions that are explicitly named in the statute. Id. at 
725-26. 
CONCLUSION: Since the special conditions of education, 
employment, and community service requirements are contemplated 
within the supervised release statute, actual notice is not required before 
the court may impose them. Id. at 726. 
 
United States v. Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether a defendant “need not be convicted of a 
federal crime of terrorism as defined by § 2332b(g)(5)(B) for the district 
court to apply [a federal terrorism sentencing enhancement].” Id. 1000-
01. 
ANALYSIS: The court reviewed an 11th Circuit opinion, which 
expressly confronted this issue and held that the statutory language 
“unambiguously cast a broader net by applying the enhancement to any 
offense that ‘involved’ or was ‘intended to promote’ a terrorism crime.” 
Id. at 1002 (quoting United States v. Mandhai, 375 F.3d 1243, 1247 
(11th Cir. 2004). The Sixth Circuit had held the same. Id. (citing United 
States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 517 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
CONCLUSION: The court held that a terrorism sentencing 
enhancement could be applied even when the underlying crime was not 
terrorism, but “a district court must identify which enumerated federal 
crime of terrorism the defendant intended to promote, satisfy the 
elements of § 2332b(g)(5)(A), and support its conclusions by a 
preponderance of the evidence with facts from the record,” thus 
satisfying the Booker requirements for the Federal Guidelines. Id. 
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EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
United States v. Smith, 422 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the “categorization of the reckless use of a 
firearm [regardless of it resulting in actual physical injury] as a crime of 
violence” as defined by United States Sentencing Guidelines, § 4B1.2, is 
proper. Id. at 721. 
ANALYSIS: Citing decisions from the 6th and 7th Circuits, the 8th 
Circuit found that regardless of whether there was actual physical injury 
to another or intent to harm, “discharging a firearm is an inherently risky 
act.” Id. at 722 (citing United States v. Cole, 298 F.3d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 
2002)). The court also noted that it has “previously concluded that 
certain firearm offenses that do not necessarily result in or require 
physical injury constitute crimes of violence . . . [just as] mere 
possession of a short-barreled shotgun is a crime of violence.” Id.  
Similarly, “[t]he common theme throughout these cases is that the 
recklessness of the act matters, not the intended target or actual victim.” 
Id. (citing Shepard v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1254, 1257-58 (2005)). 
CONCLUSION: Ultimately, the court held that the “district court 
properly held that the Iowa offense of the reckless use of a firearm is a 
crime of violence as defined by § 4B1.2.” Id. at 732. Essentially, 
“recklessly using a firearm around others always creates a serious risk of 
injury.” Id. 
 
In re Marlar, 432 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 303(a), “an 
alleged debtor in an involuntary bankruptcy case must timely assert his 
or her status as a farmer as an affirmative defense, lest it be waived.” Id. 
at 814. 
ANALYSIS: In a 1998 involuntary bankruptcy hearing, a federal 
bankruptcy court judged Marlar to be a debtor. Id. In December 2003, 
Marlar challenged that hearing, “asserting that 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) strips 
bankruptcy courts of subject matter jurisdiction over involuntary 
bankruptcy petitions brought against farmers.” Id.  Marlar “contended 
that he was a farmer when the involuntary petition was filed and that, 
accordingly, the bankruptcy proceedings against him should [have been] 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. The 8th Circuit adopted the 5th 
Circuit’s reasoning, which determined that status as a farmer is an 
affirmative defense rather than a question of the bankruptcy court’s 
jurisdiction. Id. (citation omitted). The court determined that § 303(a) 
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requires that “a farmer against whom an involuntary petition is filed must 
timely controvert the petition by raising his or her status as a farmer in 
order to preclude the commencement of an involuntary case.” Id. at 815. 
CONCLUSION: The court held “that an alleged debtor must timely 
assert his or her status in one of the exempted categories as an 
affirmative defense. If the alleged debtor fails to timely raise the issue, it 
is waived.” Id. 
 
NINTH CIRCUIT 
Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 435 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 
2006) 
QUESTION: “Does [the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s (“FCRA”)] 
adverse action notice requirement apply to the rates first charged in an 
initial policy of insurance or is it limited to an increase in a rate that the 
consumer has previously been charged?” Id. at 1090. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit began with the text of the statute to 
determine the meaning of the term “adverse action.” Id. The court looked 
to 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i) to define adverse action as “a denial or 
cancellation of, an increase in any charge for, or a reduction or other 
adverse or unfavorable change in the terms of coverage or amount of, 
any insurance, existing or applied for, in connection with the 
underwriting of insurance.” Id. The court then applied the ordinary 
meaning of the terms “increase” and “charge” to refute the insurance 
company’s argument that an increased charge only refers to a previous 
charge a consumer has paid. Id. The court agreed, holding that affording 
the statute its plain meaning would further the purpose of FCRA to 
“promote the rights of consumers by giving them essential information 
about how their credit report is used.” Id. at 1091-92. 
CONCLUSION: “We hold that whenever because of [a consumer’s] 
credit information a company charges a consumer a higher initial rate 
than it would otherwise have charged, it has increased the charge within 
the meaning of FCRA. Therefore, the fact that [the consumer’s] policy 
was an initial one, and his rate was the initial rate charged, is of no 
consequence.” Id. at 1092. 
 
Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175 (9th 
Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether a defendant, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 
can disqualify all district judges in a particular district court “because of 
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threats he allegedly made on the life and health of three judges in the 
district.” Id. at 1179. 
ANALYSIS: “[R]ecusal of an individual judge pursuant to § 455(a) 
may be required when the judge himself has been subject of a personal 
threat, unless the threat was motivated by a desire to recuse the judge.” 
Id. at 1179. “No reasonable observer could conclude that a threat against 
three judges based on their handling of the defendant’s pro se cases 
should be construed as a threat against all the judges of the district.” Id. 
at 1180. “[T]he threats that the defendant allegedly made were in no way 
related to complaints about the Central District as an entity.” Id. Instead, 
“the threats were aimed at particular judges perceived to have made 
unfavorable rulings in the defendant’s pro se cases.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit ruled that “[t]he district court 
correctly held that mandatory disqualification of all judges on the Central 
District of California was not justified under § 455(a).” Id. 
 
Bona v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a paroled alien, who is also deemed an 
arriving alien under 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(q), is properly precluded from 
applying for adjustment of status in removal proceedings.” Id. at 667. 
ANALYSIS: An application of the plain language revealed that the 
petitioner was an “arriving alien.” Id. at 667-68. Then, the 9th Circuit, 
persuaded by the petitioner’s argument, adopted the reasoning of Succar 
v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2005), which held that “8 C.F.R. § 245.1 
(c)(8), the regulation that precludes arriving aliens from seeking 
adjustment of status in removal proceedings, is valid.” Id. at 665. 
CONCLUSION: The petitioner is entitled to apply for adjustment in 
the removal proceedings. Id. at 664-65. 
 
Ramadan v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether a material change in circumstances affecting a 
foreign citizen’s asylum eligibility constitutes a “question of law” under 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2005). Id. at 1219-20. 
ANALYSIS: In this case, an Egyptian woman appealed the 
immigration judge’s denial of her political asylum application because 
she failed to file it within the mandatory one-year time period and did not 
demonstrate a material change in circumstances that would have excused 
her lateness. Id. at 1221. The court noted that a recently passed provision, 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D), authorizes it to review decisions about the one-year 
time bar that raise constitutional issues or questions of law. Id. The court 
488 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 2:459 
for the first time decided whether a finding of a material change in 
circumstances, or lack thereof, constitutes a question of law that is 
subject to judicial review. Id. at 1221-22. The court reviewed 
§1252(a)(2)(D)’s legislative history, concluding that a material change in 
circumstances is a question of fact, not law. Id. at 1222. 
CONCLUSION: A decision concerning the existence of a material 
change in circumstances is not a question of law under § 1252(a)(2)(D) 
and is not subject to judicial review. Id. 
 
Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial Inc., 430 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether a consumer’s dispute of the validity of a debt 
under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1692g and 1692e (2000 & 2005), must be in writing. 
ANALYSIS: In analyzing a statute a court should examine the 
statute’s plain meaning, whether the plain meaning would lead to absurd 
or unreasonable results, and legislative intent. Id. at 1081. Further, 
“where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute 
but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed 
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion 
or exclusion.” Id. (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 
(1983)). “The plain language of the text of § 1692g(a)(3) does not state 
that the consumer must dispute the debt in writing.” Id. Allowing oral 
communication “does not lead to absurd results because an oral dispute 
triggers multiple statutory protections.” Id. at 1081-82. Oral 
communication is also consistent with legislative intent of giving alleged 
debtors an opportunity to respond to initial communications from a 
collections agency. Id. at 1082. 
CONCLUSION: There is no writing requirement implicit in § 
1629g(a)(3). 
 
United States v. Esparza-Gonzalez, 422 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether under the struck jury system waivers of 
peremptory strikes can form the basis of a Batson challenge.” Id. at 902. 
ANALYSIS: Essentially, “[u]nder the struck jury system, when 
either side waives a peremptory strike, this results in an excess number 
of potential jurors, and therefore, the juror with the highest juror number 
is removed from the jury panel. For this reason, a waiver of a peremptory 
strike under this system is properly viewed as the effective removal of an 
identifiable juror.” Id. at 899. In the present context, “[b]y waiving its 
second peremptory strike, the prosecution effectively removed the only 
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potential juror [with an allegedly similar ethnic heritage as the 
defendant].” Id. at 899-900. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Batson, “held 
that a ‘state’s privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory 
challenges[] is subject to the Equal Protection Clause.’” Id. at 901 (citing 
Batson v. Kennedy, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986)). Thus, the 9th Circuit held 
“that for purposes of determining whether . . . a Batson violation has 
been established, waivers of peremptory strikes in a struck jury system 
should be treated the same as exercises of peremptory strikes in an 
alternate system.” Id. at 899. 
CONCLUSION: The court “reverse[d] the district court’s finding that 
the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of [intentional] 
discrimination.” Id. at 907. Given the practical effects of the struck jury 
system, the failure to use a peremptory strike, standing alone without 
other evidence of discriminatory intent, can form the basis of a Batson 
challenge. Id. 
 
Panaro v. City of North Las Vegas, 432 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a prisoner’s participation in an internal 
investigation of official conduct should be considered equivalent to 
exhausting a detention center’s available administrative grievance 
procedure.” Id. at 953. 
ANALYSIS: First, the court pointed to the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act (“PLRA”), which “precludes an action by a prisoner ‘until such 
available administrative remedies as are available have been exhausted.” 
Id. Because the plaintiff did not “initiate, let alone exhaust, his 
administrative remedies through that procedure” the court found the 
PLRA to preclude plaintiff’s civil rights claim. Id. Second, the court 
noted that the 6th Circuit had come to the same conclusion when 
considering the issue at bar. Id. 
CONCLUSION: Ultimately, the 9th Circuit adopted the rule that 
“participating in an internal affairs investigation does not by itself satisfy 
the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA.” Id. 
 
Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC, 432 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the McDonnell Douglas test, as applied to 
claims of employment discrimination, must be modified when applied to 
“claims of racial discrimination in non-employment contracts arising 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.” Id. at 959. 
ANALYSIS: The court first held “that the first three elements of the 
McDonnell Douglas test are easily adapted to claims arising under 
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section 1981 outside of an employment context.” Id. Therefore, the 
plaintiff must show that: “(1) it is a member of a protected class, (2) it 
attempted to contract for certain services, and (3) it was denied the right 
to contract for those services.” Id. As for the fourth element, which 
requires “that such services remained available to similarly-situated 
individuals who were not members of the plaintiff’s protected class,” the 
court declined to determine whether such must be modified, finding that 
the plaintiff “offered clear evidence that a similarly-situated group of a 
different protected class was offered the contractual services which were 
denied” to the plaintiff. Id. 
CONCLUSION: Ultimately, the court applied all four elements of the 
McDonnell Douglas test without modification. 
 
Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 435 F.3d 1011 
(9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the court should grant a writ of mandamus 
pursuant to the Crime Victim’s Rights Act (“CVRA”) because the lower 
court denied the victim an opportunity to speak at a second co-
defendant’s sentencing merely because it believed that it had heard the 
victim’s concerns at the first hearing. Id. at 1013 
ANALYSIS: A writ of mandamus can be granted when the decision 
merits review under the Bauman standard. Once the petitioner meets this 
threshold standard, the court must then apply the Bauman factors and 
determine if a writ should be granted. In this case, the petitioner raises an 
issue of first impression, and therefore meets the threshold requirement 
for review; thus, the court must apply the Bauman factors and determine 
if writ should be granted. Id. at 1017. The underlying rationale in the 
Bauman standard is to prevent interlocutory review. Id. However, in this 
case, the writ was made pursuant to the CVRA, which specifically allows 
for the interlocutory review that Bauman seeks to prevent. Id. Therefore, 
the Bauman factors are inapplicable in the petitioner’s case. Instead, 
under the CVRA, the 9th Circuit held that the court must issue the writ 
when there is an abuse of discretion or legal error. Id. The court noted 
that the 2nd Circuit has held similarly and that it is unaware of any 
decision to the contrary. Id. 
CONCLUSION: “The District Court here committed an error of law 
by refusing to allow petitioner to allocute at Zvi’s sentencing and we 
must therefore issue the writ.” Id. 
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Hamilton v. Wash. State Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. Pension Plan, 
433 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether, “under ERISA, a QDRO can divest a 
surviving spouse of her statutorily-guaranteed right to a QPSA only if the 
QDRO expressly assigns surviving spouse rights to a former spouse.” Id. 
ANALYSIS: The court first looked to the plain language of the 
statute to determine the scope of the strict spousal consent privileges of § 
1055 of ERISA and the interplay between § 1059(d)(3)(F) which states 
that “‘[t]o the extent provided in any qualified domestic relations order,’ 
surviving spouse rights may be assigned to a ‘former spouse.’”  Id. at 
1098-99.  The court determined that a QDRO must specifically assign 
the rights under it to a former spouse in order to divest the surviving 
spouse’s right to benefits under the pension plan. Id. The 9th Circuit also 
found support for its interpretation of the statute in other circuits, citing 
to 5th and 3rd Circuit precedent. Id. at 1100. 
CONCLUSION: “[A] surviving spouse benefit must be explicitly 
assigned to a former spouse in a QDRO in order to overcome the 
surviving spouse’s right to a QPSA under ERISA.” Id. at 1103-04. 
 
United States v. Pacheco-Navarette, 432 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether a guilty plea colloquy is deficient when a 
court does not make a defendant aware of rights established by changes 
in the law or subsequent judicial decisions. Id. at 969. 
ANALYSIS: In this 9th Circuit case, defendant challenged his plea of 
guilty which was made pursuant to a plea agreement. Id. at 968. The 
court noted that FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 obligates a court to describe to a 
defendant the consequences of the plea that have “‘a definite, immediate 
and largely automatic effect on the range of [his] punishment.’” Id. at 
969 (quoting United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 
2000)). The court stated that “potential changes in the law” have no such 
effect on a defendant’s ultimate sentence. Id. Therefore, the court held 
that defendant could not claim that a guilty plea was rendered unknowing 
or involuntary when the lower court correctly stated his rights at the time 
the colloquy was given. Id. The court noted the issue of first impression 
and rested its holding on “well-established law stating that substantive 
changes in the law do not invalidate guilty pleas.” Id. at 969 (citing 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756-58 (1970); United States v. 
Cardenas, 405 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “a guilty plea colloquy is not 
deficient solely because the district court did not advise a defendant of 
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rights established by subsequent judicial decisions or changes in the 
law.” Id. at 969. 
 
United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether Congress exceeded its authority ‘to 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,’ U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 
in enacting a statute that makes it a felony for any U.S. citizen who 
travels in ‘foreign commerce,’ i.e. to a foreign country, to then engage in 
an illegal commercial sex act with a minor.” Id. at 1101. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that only a plain showing that 
Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority would suffice to 
invalidate the law. Id. at 1109 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598, 607 (2000)). The court held that the showing was not made by the 
defendant in this case. Id. The court noted that Congress’s power to 
regulate commerce between nations is not as well defined as its domestic 
powers. Id. at 1112. Congress’s power for regulating commerce between 
nations, the court held, is sweeping and not subject to restrictions that 
may be put on the power domestically. Id. at 1113. Using the rational 
basis test, the court analyzed the statute and determined that because it 
targeted commercial sex, it was constitutional. Id. at 1115. 
CONCLUSION: Congress was within its authority under the Foreign 
Commerce Clause to prohibit U.S. citizens from traveling in foreign 
commerce to engage in illegal commercial sex acts with minors. Id. at 
1117. 
 
United States v. Scott, 424 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether police may conduct a search based on less 
than probable cause of an individual released while awaiting trial.” Id. at 
888. 
ANALYSIS: In determining whether to grant the defendant’s motion 
to suppress evidence obtained by officers while released on 
recognizance, the court carefully conducted a two-step inquiry into 
whether: 1) “a drug test and search of the [defendant]’s house were valid 
because the [defendant] consented to them as a condition of his release”; 
and 2) “the search in question (taking the fact of consent into account) 
was reasonable.” Id. at 890-893. The court pointed out that “one who has 
been released on pretrial bail does not lose his or her Fourth Amendment 
right to be free of unreasonable searches,” nor do they waive these rights 
by consenting to searches as a condition of such release. Id. at 893. 
Second, although “Fourth Amendment reasonableness” standards of 
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probable cause may be relaxed “when ‘special needs, beyond the normal 
need for law enforcement,’ make an insistence on the otherwise 
applicable level of suspicion impracticable,” the court concluded that 
protecting the community was not a special needs exception as crime 
prevention was a quintessential law enforcement purpose. Id. at 893 
(citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)). Furthermore, the 
court found that the connection between the drug test and the harm to be 
avoided, nonappearance in court, was not obvious. Id. at 895. The court 
noted that the issue before the court was not only one of first impression 
in the 9th Circuit, but also “one of first impression in any federal circuit 
and the vast majority of state courts.” Id. at 889. 
CONCLUSION: The court “affirm[ed] the district court’s order 
granting the [defendant]’s motion to suppress,” holding that warrantless 
searches, including drug testing, imposed as a condition of pretrial 
release, required a showing of probable cause, despite defendant’s 
prerelease consent.” Id. at 898. 
 
Kelava v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether it is impermissible “to deny [an alien 
petitioner] eligibility for previously available discretionary relief” of a 
“waiver of inadmissibility or cancellation of removal for having engaged 
in terrorist activity” retroactively within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(4)(B) and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II). Id. at 1121. 
ANALYSIS: In 1978, petitioner, an alien from Croatia, and another 
man “entered the West German Consulate in Chicago, armed with 
handguns, ropes and a phony bomb” and “seized several employees.” Id. 
at 1122. “[I]nitially indicted and convicted in federal court of conspiracy 
and kidnapping of foreign officials,” petitioner later pled guilty to 
unarmed imprisonment of a foreign national on retrial and was 
sentenced. Id. “Nearly 20 years later . . . the INS commenced removal 
proceedings . . . pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)” and 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(4)(B). Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) found 
the alien removable for the terrorist activities and “precluded from 
seeking a waiver of inadmissibility under former § 212(c) under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), 
commonly referred to as a ‘§ 212(c) waiver.’” Id. In an issue of first 
impression, the alien argued that it was “impermissibly retroactive to 
deny him eligibility for previously available discretionary relief” (a § 
212(c) waiver) because he was not convicted of engaging in a terrorist 
activity but rather entered into a plea bargain. Id. at 1121. However, the 
court reasoned that aliens “‘cannot plausibly claim that they would have 
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acted any differently if they had known’ about the elimination of § 
212(c) relief, even though the criminal act and conviction occurred 
before the [Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”)] amend[ed]” the statute. Id. at 1124. The alien 
only had to have committed, not been convicted of, the terrorist act, and 
it would be absurd for him to argue that he would not have committed 
that act if he had known he would lose the possibility of obtaining § 
212(c) relief. Thus, “there is no retroactive effect in applying the IIRIRA 
elimination § 212(c) relief to [an alien], who quite clearly engaged in the 
requisite terrorist activity prior to IIRIRA’s enactment.” Id. at 1126. 
CONCLUSION: The court disagreed with petitioner, finding that it 
was not impermissibly retroactive to deny [alien-petitioner] eligibility for 
a § 212(c) waiver from removal when the alien “had engaged in terrorist 
activity following his admission to the United States” despite it being 
prior to the statute’s amendment. Id. at 1123. 
 
Mancebo v. Adams, 435 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the failure to prevent the introduction of 
improper polygraph evidence can serve as grounds for reversing a 
conviction pursuant to AEDPA.” Id. at 979. 
ANALYSIS: “Mancebo argues that he was denied his right to 
effective counsel at his original trial because his counsel failed to object 
to the state’s introduction of the recording of a conversation Mancebo 
had with police, during which Mancebo indicated his desire not to take a 
polygraph examination.” Id. The court first noted that “[p]ursuant to the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), we 
can only overturn Mancebo’s conviction if the state court decision 
affirming his conviction was ‘an unreasonable application of . . . clearly 
established Federal law.’” Id. at 978. The court then noted that “for an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim to succeed, a party must 
demonstrate that the performance of his or her attorney ‘fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness’ and that ‘there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.’” Id. at 979 (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1994)). The court held that it “need not 
determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before 
examining the prejudice suffered.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
697). 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “[i]n addition to the small 
role the polygraph evidence played in the trial, there is sufficient other 
evidence supporting Mancebo’s conviction to preclude us from finding 
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‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Id. at 
980 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
 
McSherry v. City of Long Beach, 423 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the grant of a motion for judgment as matter 
of law under FED. R. CIV. P. 50 “at the outset of trial, prior to the 
presentation of any evidence, is appropriate.” Id. at 1019. 
ANALYSIS: FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a) “presumes that a jury trial has 
begun, and that the nonmoving party ‘has been fully heard’ on the issue 
prior to the court’s ruling.” Id. Further, Rule 50(a)(2) provides that 
motions for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before 
submission of the case to the jury. However, the argument that a “Rule 
50 motion may be made at, literally, ‘any time’ once a trial has 
commenced, regardless of the state of evidence admitted” is erroneous. 
Id. “Nothing about the language or structure of the provisions suggests 
that Rule 50(a)(2) has a force independent of Rule 50(a)(1). Reading the 
two provisions together, it is apparent that Rule 50(a)(1) sets forth the 
standards under which a court may grant judgment as a matter of law, 
while Rule 50(a)(2) explains when a party may make a motion.” Id. 
Furthermore, Rule 50(a)(2) is “not intended as an alternative mechanism 
for obtaining summary judgment, as the advisory committee notes make 
clear.” Id. at 1020. 
CONCLUSION: The court ruled that the trial judge erred in granting 
judgment as a matter of law before taking evidence. Id. Under Rule 50, 
the nonmoving party has a right to be fully heard on the issue before the 
grant of the motion. Id. at 1019. The court concluded “this use of Rule 50 
is not supported by the language of the rule, the advisory committee’s 
notes, or caselaw governing the proper use of Rule 50.” Id. 
 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
Am. Soda v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Group, 428 F.3d 921 (10th Cir. 
2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether the U.S. district courts are courts of the 
various states in which they are located.” Id. at 925. 
ANALYSIS: “Other courts have described the issue as a question of 
sovereignty versus geography.” Id. at 925. “If the contract language 
refers to the state courts to the exclusion of the federal courts, it is a term 
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of sovereignty.” Id. Otherwise, if the contract language encompasses 
particular state courts and the federal court sitting within that particular 
state, then “it is a term of geography.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court of appeals concluded that “the forum 
selection clause in the parties’ agreement designates the Colorado state 
court system as the forum for resolution of disputes arising out of the 
contract, and does not include the federal district court.” Id. at 926. 
 
In re Joelson, 427 F.3d 700 (10th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the phrase “respecting the debtor’s financial 
condition” in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) & (B) “should be interpreted 
broadly, to include all oral communications that reflect on the extent of 
any of [the debtor’s] assets, liabilities, and income,” or strictly, “to 
include only information as to [the debtor’s] overall financial health.” Id. 
at 705-06. 
ANALYSIS: Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed 
this issue, the decision in Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995), “lends some 
support to the notion that a statement ‘respecting the debtor’s . . . 
financial condition’ must relate to a debtor’s overall financial health.” Id. 
at 710. Additionally, the court reasoned that a strict reading is “consistent 
with the text and structure of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress’s intent as 
expressed in the legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B), 
and case law.” Id. at 706. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that the phrase “respecting the 
debtor’s financial condition” in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) & (B) “should 
be interpreted strictly to include only information as to [the debtor’s] 
overall financial health.” Id. at 709. 
 
Mactec, Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821 (10th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether “a non-appealability clause in an arbitration 
agreement that forecloses judicial review of an arbitration award beyond 
the district court level is enforceable.” Id. at 824. 
ANALYSIS: In this case, the parties included a clause in their 
contract providing for arbitration of any disputed contractual term and 
that such arbitration would be final once confirmed by the district court. 
Id. at 823. A dispute arose, the parties submitted it to arbitration, the 
arbitrator found in the defendant’s favor and the plaintiff sought judicial 
review of the arbitrator’s decision. Id. at 823-24. The court reviewed its 
prior holdings concerning the enforceability of contractual restrictions 
limiting judicial review of arbitration awards. Id. at 828-30. 
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CONCLUSION: The court held that “contractual provisions limiting 
the right to appeal from a district court’s judgment confirming or 
vacating an arbitration award are permissible, so long as the intent to do 
so is clear and unequivocal.” Id. at 830. 
 
Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. And Energy Workers Int’l Union v. Cont’l 
Carbon Co., 428 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: What is the correct standard for determining “whether 
particular state’s laws are comparable to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)” for 
purposes of determining whether federal action is barred under the Clean 
Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2000), and if so, whether the 
jurisdictional bar applies to both civil penalties and equitable relief. Id. at 
1288-89. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that the “[CWA] calls for something 
less than a rigorous comparability standard.” Id. at 1293. Hence, the 10th 
Circuit followed the 11th Circuit’s “rough comparability” approach in 
determining whether a state law is comparable to the CWA. Id. The 
“rough comparability” approach examines “the three categories of 
provisions” found within 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g), which includes “penalty 
assessment, public participation, and judicial review.” Id. at 1294. 
Therefore, any court using the “rough comparability” approach “engaged 
in an independent analysis for each category of state-law provisions.” Id. 
If one category “is found to be lacking,” then the suit cannot be 
precluded. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit ruled “that in order to satisfy 
U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii), three categories of state law provisions-
penalty-assessment, public participation and judicial review must be 
roughly comparable to the corresponding categories of federal 
provisions.” Id. at 1288. In addition, the jurisdictional bar found under 
this section of the statute only applies to civil penalty claims. Id. at 1289. 
 
Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the existence of a state-law cause of action 
for damages, standing alone, precludes a Bivens claim against an 
employee of a privately operated prison.” Id. at 1100. 
ANALYSIS: Although considered by three district courts, no court of 
appeals has ruled on the matter. Id. The court held that under state law 
the employees had a duty to protect the detainee from known harm, and 
the detainee thus had a state tort remedy for violation of that duty. Id. 
State law also provided a civil remedy for eavesdropping or breach of 
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privacy; therefore, implying a federal cause of action was therefore 
unwarranted. Id. Moreover, the court continued, the detainee’s 
segregation was based solely on the needs of the prison, was not 
punitive, and the detainee was provided with reasonable access to legal 
materials. Id. at 1103. 
CONCLUSION: Ultimately, the court affirmed the district court in 
holding that under Malesko, a Bivens claim should not be implied when 
an alternative cause of action arising under either state or federal law 
exists. Id. Thus, “federal prisoners have no implied right of action for 
damages against an employee of a privately operated prison under 
contract with the United States Marshals Service when state or federal 
law affords the prisoner an alternative cause of action for damages for 
the alleged injury.” Id. at 1108. 
 
Norton v. Marietta, Oklahoma, 432 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether a plaintiff “who seeks to bring suit about 
prison life after he has been released and is no longer a prisoner [must] 
satisfy the [Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)] before bringing 
suit.” Id. at 1151. 
ANALYSIS: Because the PLRA requires “a prisoner [to] exhaust all 
available administrative remedies before bringing suit,” the court first 
looked to the PLRA’s definition of “prisoner.” Id. at 1149 (emphasis 
added). The PLRA defines “prisoner” as “any person incarcerated or 
detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or 
adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and 
conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary 
program.” Id. at 1150. Siding with other circuits who “have unanimously 
held that it is the plaintiff’s status at the time he files suit that determines 
whether [the PLRA] exhaustion provision applies,” the court found that 
the exhaustion provision does not apply to a plaintiff who is not a 
prisoner. Id. at 1150. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit, siding with its sister circuits, 
found the “statutory language [to be] plain and unambiguous [and] 
[t]herefore plaintiff, who was not a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or 
other correctional facility when he brought suit, did not have to exhaust 
his administrative remedies first.” Id. 
 
United States v. Morales-Chaires, 430 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether “the sentencing factors specified in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a) support a sentence below the otherwise applicable Guideline 
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range,” post-Booker, because of the “disparities between sentences 
imposed in districts where a ‘fast-track’ program exists for aliens 
accused of illegal reentry and in districts, like Colorado, where no such 
‘fast-track’ program exists.” Id. at 1127. 
ANALYSIS: The court discussed so-called “fast track” sentencing 
programs in certain states where illegal immigrants would plead guilty 
and waive certain appeals in exchange for lighter sentences, and the fact 
that defendant was not subject to a fast-track proceeding in Colorado. Id. 
at 1127. It noted that since the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were 
changed by the Booker decision, federal courts had not developed a 
consistent standard for reviewing the fast-track program. Id. at 1130. The 
1st Circuit had suggested that downward departures were not necessary, 
while several district courts had held that courts may use discretion to 
minimize sentencing disparities. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court upheld defendant’s conviction, but did not 
make a determination as to the propriety of the fast-track sentencing 
programs. Id. at 1131. The court held that defendant’s sentence was 
appropriate under conditions laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Id. 
 
Robbins v. Wilkie, 433 F.3d 755 (10th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a party’s “failure to appeal the district court’s 
order denying dismissal on qualified immunity precludes [the party] 
from appealing an order denying summary judgment on the same 
qualified immunity issues.” Id. at 762. 
ANALYSIS: “Although this issue is one of first impression in this 
circuit, the Supreme Court and several other circuits have addressed the 
issue.” Id. In Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996), the Court 
concluded that “resolution of the immunity question may ‘require more 
than one judiciously timed appeal.’” Id. (citing Behrens, 516 U.S. at 
309). It reasoned “that a defendant should be permitted to raise the 
qualified immunity defense at successive stages of litigation because 
different legal factors are relevant at various stages.” Id. (citing Behrens, 
516 U.S. at 309). The 3rd Circuit ruled that “a defendant’s failure to 
appeal an order denying dismissal on qualified immunity does not 
preclude him from appealing a subsequent denial of the same legal 
arguments in a motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity.” 
Id. (citing Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 120-21 (3d Cir. 
1996)). The 9th Circuit went further and “assert[ed] jurisdiction over an 
appeal of an order denying a second motion for summary judgment after 
defendant failed to appeal the denial of his first summary judgment 
motion.” Id. (citing Knox v. Southwest Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 1105-06 
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(9th Cir. 1997)). Thus, “after Behrens, no circuit has held that an 
appellate court lacks jurisdiction over denial of a motion for summary 
judgment when the motion raises the same legal arguments as a prior 
unappealed motion to dismiss but relies on evidence developed during 
discovery.  Similarly, [this court] decline[s] to adopt such a rule.” Id. at 
763. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that in the present case, 
“[d]efendants’ failure to appeal the district court’s denial of dismissal on 
qualified immunity does not divest this court of jurisdiction to consider 
Defendants’ current appeal because Defendants’ summary judgment 




United States v. Howell, 425 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether a convicted felon is entitled to the actual or 
constructive return of his or her firearms under FED. R. CRIM.  P. 41(e). 
ANALYSIS: “‘Rule 41(e) compels a district court to afford . . . 
persons an opportunity to submit evidence in order to demonstrate that 
they are lawfully entitled to the challenged property . . . . When it is 
apparent that the person seeking a return of the property is not lawfully 
entitled to own or possess the property, the district court need not hold an 
evidentiary hearing. Federal law prohibits convicted felons from 
possessing guns. Based upon [defendant’s] status as a convicted felon, 
the district court could properly conclude without receiving evidence that 
[the defendant] is not entitled to a return of firearms.’” Id. at 976 
(quoting United States v. Felici, 208 F.3d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 2000)). 
According to the 11th Circuit, a convicted felon could not use Rule 41(e) 
to make a request of constructive return of firearms. Id. at 977. 
Constructive return would either be accomplished through the sale of 
those firearms with the proceeds going to the convicted felon or by 
allowing a third party to hold the weapons in trust for the felon. Id. The 
11th Circuit noted that “‘[f]ederal law prohibits convicted felons from 
possessing guns . . . . [The defendant] is also not entitled to have the 
firearms held in trust for him by a third party. Such a request suggests 
constructive possession. Any firearm possession, actual or constructive, 
by a convicted felon is prohibited by law.’” Id. (quoting Felici, 208 F.3d 
at 670)). 
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CONCLUSION: A convicted felon cannot successfully use Rule 
41(e) to force a court to actually or constructively return firearms to the 
felon’s possession. 
 
Jackson v. Cintas Corp., 425 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether an order compelling arbitration and 
dismissing a complaint, but retaining jurisdiction over a motion for 
sanctions, is a final and appealable decision.” Id. at 1315. 
ANALYSIS: The court commenced its analysis with a thorough 
review of the statute: “The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) [9 U.S.C. § 
16(a)(3)] allows an immediate appeal from any ‘final decision with 
respect to arbitration.’” Id. at 1316. A decision is final when the entire 
case is completed and no part remains before the court. Id. In this case, 
the district court dismissed the case, but retained jurisdiction over the 
motion for sanctions. Id. The 11th Circuit, drawing on prior precedent, 
viewed the motion for sanctions as a collateral issue. Id. 
CONCLUSION: “Because the dismissal disposes of the entire case 
on the merits and the motion for sanctions raises only a collateral issue, 
[the court] conclude[d] that the dismissal [was] a final and appealable 
order.” Id. at 1315. 
 
Tinker v. Beasley, 429 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2005)    
QUESTION: Whether a “coercive interrogation that does not result 
in a confession or other self-incrimination may constitute a violation of 
substantive due process rights.” Id. at 1327. 
ANALYSIS: Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. 
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985), which held that courts must condemn 
interrogation techniques that “are so offensive to a civilized system of 
justice,” the 11th Circuit ruled that “the officers were justified in 
believing they had the right person in custody at the time of the 
interrogation.” Id. at 1329. Therefore, the officers’ conduct was not “so 
offensive” to the justice system as to warrant a due process violation. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “only the most egregious official 
conduct” during an interrogation will be considered a due process 
violation. Id. at 1328. 
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Peebles v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 431 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether the amount in controversy requirement for 
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) is controlled by the 
amount claimed in an original action that went to arbitration, or by the 
amount of an arbitration award. Id. at 1325. 
ANALYSIS: The maximum amount sought by the plaintiff in this 
case was the “vacatur of a zero dollar arbitration award and a new 
arbitration hearing at which he could urge his argument that he was 
entitled to up to $2,000,000 in damages.” Id. at 1325-26. 
CONCLUSION: “A federal court has subject matter jurisdiction 
where a party seeking to vacate an arbitration award hearing at which he 
will demand a sum which exceeds the amount in controversy for 
diversity jurisdiction purposes.” Id. at 1325.  
 
United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 987 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether, under the 1991 version of 18 U.S.C. § 
3583(e)(3), the statutory caps apply to each revocation of supervised 
release or to the aggregate of the sentences imposed on multiple 
revocations of supervised release.” Id. at 988. 
ANALYSIS: Section 3583(e)(3) allows a court to require a felon on 
supervised release to serve his remaining time back in jail if that felon 
violates any of the provisions of the supervised release. Id. at 988. The 
statute also provides a method for granting credits for time served on 
supervised release. Id. First, the court looked to the plain meaning of the 
statute to determine its meaning; however, in this case, the court found 
that the statute was ambiguous. Id. at 989. The 11th Circuit then looked 
to the legislative history of the statute to find support for the aggregation 
argument. Id. The court further noted that six other circuits have 
addressed the issue and found that the aggregation method should be 
applied. Id. 
CONCLUSION: “Section 3583(e)(3)’s statutory maximums apply in 
the aggregate.” Id. at 990. 
 
Klay v. All Defendants, et al., 425 F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “Whether the requirement of reasonable compensation 
in FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B) obliges a party that has compelled, by 
subpoena, the production of confidential data to pay a license fee for the 
data, even though the district court, by protective order, limited the use 
of the data to litigation purposes, avoided any diminution of the value of 
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the data, and required the payment of the production costs of the data.” 
Id. at 980. 
ANALYSIS: First, the 11th Circuit stated that district courts have 
broad discretion in managing pretrial discovery and allocation of costs; 
therefore, it only reviewed the district court’s interpretation of Rule 
45(c)(3)(B). Id. at 982. The court began its analysis by looking to the text 
of Rule 45(c)(3)(B) to determine if the enforcement of a subpoena for 
confidential data requires the payment of reasonable compensation. Id. 
The court looked to the construction of the statute itself to determine that 
the reasonable compensation standard was intended to apply to a 
subpoena that requires disclosure of certain types of commercial 
information. Id. at 983. The 11th Circuit then found that reasonable 
compensation is required for any losses caused by the production of 
confidential material. Id. However, the court noted that reasonable 
compensation is a broad and flexible term; therefore, it does not 
necessarily apply in every possible situation. Id. at 984. The court then 
found that the district court did not abuse its discretion since the 
company suffered no harm or loss by producing the information. Id. at 
986. 
CONCLUSION: The district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
only required payment of production costs, because the property in 
question did not diminish in value. Id. at 980. 
 
United States v. Rahim, 431 F.3d 753 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) “permit[s] two convictions 
for the use of a firearm in the course of a crime of violence when the 
underlying offenses were part of a single course of conduct . . . [and] if 
the statute allows two convictions for a single course of conduct, 
[whether it is] unconstitutional under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 757. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[n]othing in the language of 
section 924(c)” suggests that the statute prohibits two convictions simply 
because the “predicate crimes of violence arise from the same course of 
conduct.” Id. Rather, “section 924(c) makes it a crime to use, carry, or 
possess a firearm ‘during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . .’” 
Id. (quoting § 924(c)(1)(A) (2000)). Finally, the court noted that “[t]his 
interpretation is consistent with our precedent and the decision of every 
other circuit to address the issue on similar facts.” Id. As to the issue of 
double jeopardy, the court reasoned that “[m]ultiple convictions for the 
same course of conduct violate the Double Jeopardy Clause unless each 
of the two offenses charged ‘requires proof of an additional fact which 
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the other does not.’” Id. at 758 (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 
284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)). In this case, each conviction “required proof 
of an element that the other did not.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that § 924(c) permits two convictions 
arising from the same course of conduct, and such convictions are not 
prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause so long as each conviction 
“required proof of an element that the other did not.” Id. 
 
United States v. Grant, 431 F.3d 760 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: In determining intended loss under United States 
Sentencing Guidelines § 2B1.1, “whether a district court clearly errs by 
including the full face value of photocopied corporate checks in its 
calculation.” Id. at 762. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that a district court must 
make a reasonable estimate of the intended loss. Id. Next, the court noted 
that other circuits, including the 3rd and 10th Circuits, have concluded 
that a “district court does not clearly err when it uses the full face value 
of a check to calculate intended loss.” Id. Finally, the court observed that 
in the context of stolen credit cards, the 11th Circuit previously 
determined that “‘a district court does not err in determining the amount 
of the intended loss as the total line of credit to which Defendant could 
have access, especially when Defendant presents no evidence that he did 
not intend to utilize all of the credit available on the cards.’” Id. at 764 
(quoting United States v. Manoocher Nosrati Shamloo, 255 F.3d 1290, 
1291 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “when an individual 
possesses a stolen check, or a photocopy of a stolen check, for the 
purpose of counterfeiting, the district court does not clearly err when it 
uses the full face value of the stolen check in making a reasonable 
calculation of the intended loss.” Id. at 765. 
 
United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 767 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: The court examined “the meaning of the word ‘any’ as 
it is used in United States Sentencing Guideline § 2K2.1(c)(1).” Id. at 
768. 
ANALYSIS: The court rejected defendant’s argument that the word 
“any” is limited to the “firearms that he was charged with possessing.” 
Id. at 769. The court reasoned that where the guidelines reference the 
firearm in possession, they require that “the firearm had to be the one 
which was charged in the violation.” Id. The court noted that the word 
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“any” is “general and nonspecific,” and recognized that the guidelines 
“evince an understanding of this distinction.” Id. Finally, the court 
observed that the 8th and 10th Circuits also hold that “‘any firearm’ truly 
means any firearm.” Id. at 770. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that the word “any” includes “any 
firearm that is used in connection with the commission of another 
offense which is within the relevant conduct of the charged offense.” Id. 
at 768. 
 
Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: What is the “precise test for determining whether the 
defendants’ actions violated the plaintiffs’ rights against retaliation.” Id. 
at 1250. 
ANALYSIS: In this civil rights case, the court looked to the law 
applied in other circuits and found a common three-prong test. Id. The 
plaintiff first must establish that his act or speech was constitutionally 
protected; second, that the defendant’s retaliatory action adversely 
affected the protected act or speech; and third, that a causal connection 
exists between the retaliatory conduct and the adverse affect it had on 
speech. Id. The court was concerned only with which standard to apply 
to the second prong and looked to other circuits, the majority of which 
utilized an objective “ordinary firmness” test. Id. at 1250-51. The court 
found the adoption of an objective test by the majority of other circuits to 
be persuasive and sided with their reasoning that “[a]n objective standard 
provides notice to government officials of when their retaliatory actions 
violate a plaintiff’s First Amendment rights” whereas a subjective 
standard would lead to inconsistent rulings on liability despite identical 
conduct. Id. at 1250. Finally, the court held that the objective standard is 
consistent with statements from other 11th Circuit cases. Id. at 1254. 
CONCLUSION: The court ultimately utilized an objective “ordinary 
firmness” test to determine whether defendants’ actions violated 
plaintiffs’ rights against retaliation. Id. at 1251. 
 
Watson v. Drummon Co., 436 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether and under what circumstances a union can 
qualify as an employer for purposes of the EPPA (“Employee Polygraph 
Protection Act”).” Id. at 1316. 
ANALYSIS: In considering this question, the 11th Circuit adopts the 
“economic reality test,” which defines “employer” as the “level of 
control the union yielded over the employer as per the economic realities 
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of their relationship.” Id. The Court reasoned that “given the substantial 
similarities between the definition of “employer in the EEPA and in the 
FMLA and FLSA, we find that the economic reality test appropriate here 
as well.” Id. In addition, the court pointed to del Canto v. ITT Sheraton 
Corp., 865 F. Supp. 927, 932-33 (D.D.C. 1994), and noted that the Court 
used the “economic reality test” to answer this precise question. 
CONCLUSION: “In this case there is no evidence that the Union 
exerted control of the company to be considered an ‘employer.’” Id. at 
1316. “The record indicates that the Union was acting in the interests of 
its members . . . and not in the interest of the company.” Id. The 
company denied the Union’s request for the reinstatement of its 
members. Id. The Union’s suggestion for polygraph tests was to provide 
for a quick way for the employees to clear their names and regain their 
jobs, not to benefit the employer. Id. 
 
Barnes v. United States, 437 F.3d 1074 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996, whether “a timely motion seeking a new trial under FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 33 serves to render a judgment of conviction as not final for 
purposes of the running of the one-year statute of limitations under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255.” Id. at 1078 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 246 F.3d 
655, 657 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
ANALYSIS: The 1st, 4th, and 6th Circuits had held that a Rule 33 
filing did not extend the statute of limitations. Id. at 1078-79.  A 
“petitioner was free to file his § 2255 [motion to vacate] without fear that 
it would be dismissed for failing to exhaust post-conviction remedies.” 
Id. at 1079. The 1st Circuit had determined that the “one-year statute of 
limitations would sometimes require a prisoner to initiate duplicative 
proceedings, [but the] district courts were well equipped to alleviate the 
problem through consolidation of motions for collateral relief.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: Defendant’s “§ 2255 motion, filed nearly two years 
after the Supreme Court denied him certiorari, was untimely,” and a 
Rule 33 filing “had no effect on when his conviction became ‘final.’” Id. 
 
United States v. Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: There are three issues of first impression presented for 
the court: (1) “whether, under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004), a warrant of deportation is testimonial evidence subject to 
confrontation at trial; (2) whether, under Crawford, a defendant has a 
right to confrontation at sentencing; and (3) whether, under Shepard v. 
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United States, 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005), a sentencing court may use 
documents other than court records to identify a defendant with a 
conviction.” Id. at 1143. 
ANALYSIS: As to the first issue, “[w]e are persuaded that a warrant 
of deportation does not implicate adversarial concerns in the same way 
or to the same degree as testimonial evidence. A warrant of deportation 
is recorded routinely and not in preparation for a criminal trial.” Id. at 
1145. As to the right to confrontation at sentencing, the court ruled that 
“[w]e also have held recently that the admission of hearsay testimony at 
a sentencing hearing ‘cannot be plain error.’” Id. at 1146 (quoting United 
States v. Quan Chau, 426 F.2d 1227, 1254-55 (11th Cir. 1982)). “The 
Supreme Court, in distinguishing pre-trial rights, explicitly has said that 
‘the right to confrontation is a trial right.’” Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 (1987)).  “Shepard [ ] restrict[s] only the sources 
a sentencing court may consider to determine the character of a prior 
conviction as a violent felony.” Id. at 1146 
CONCLUSION: “Because a warrant of deportation does not raise the 
concerns regarding testimonial evidence stated in Crawford, we conclude 
that a warrant of deportation is non-testimonial and therefore is not 
subject to confrontation.” Id. at 1145. The court joined the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 
6th, 7th, 8th, and 10th Circuits and concluded, “[w]e see no reason to 
extend Crawford to sentencing proceedings. The right to confrontation is 
not a sentencing right.” Id. at 1146. “The fact of a prior conviction 
clearly may be found by the district court.” Id. at 1147. 
 
